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Abstract: One key advantage of agent-based modeling (ABM) is the one-to-one
correspondence of real-world and computational agents, which facilitates participatory
simulation and model-enhanced learning. Using ABM effectively poses a number of
challenges that have not been fully resolved yet. Some of these challenges relate to
organizational and institutional factors, such as finding an appropriate boundary
arrangement in which scientists, policy makers and stakeholders can interact and jointly
make use of the models. Other challenges relate to technical and economic factors, as the
models must ensure continuous stakeholder involvement and actually provide some returns
to end-users. This research tested computer-based decision tools in a knowledge broker
arrangement. We applied the MP-MAS software to simulate how farmers interact with each
other and react to changes in their economic and natural environment. In particular, we
used the model for evaluating the willingness-to-pay for the construction of a new
reservoir. A key innovation of the research was the development of the decision-support
tools in close interaction with multiple stakeholders, including water user associations and
members of the irrigation and agricultural administration. This interaction, which was
organized in the form of individual consultations, workshops and training sessions, ensured
that the simulations addressed the needs and priorities of different stakeholders and took
their local knowledge into account.
Keywords: Mathematical programming; multi-agent system; water shadow price, reservoir,
decision support.
1.

Introduction

In recent years, multi-stakeholder governance structures, such as River Basin Management
Boards, have gained increasing importance for the management of water resources [Neef
2009]. By providing a platform for knowledge exchange and negotiation, such governance
structures have a considerable potential for improving water resources management,
because they can take the socio-economic complexities of river basins into account. To
become more effective in their decision-making, such platforms benefit from access to
policy-relevant information about the bio-physical parameters that determine the
opportunities and challenges of water resources management [Hare et al. 2003; Letcher et
al. 2006]. In particular, they benefit from information about the economic, social and
environmental impacts of different development and management options [Hazell et al.,
2001]. Likewise, policy-makers at the regional and national level, who make ultimate
decisions on public investments in water resources development, will be able to make more
informed decisions if they receive adequate information on the impact of different
investment scenarios. Science-based information is, of course, only one factor that
influences decision-making on river basin management. Ultimately, such decisions reflect
policy beliefs as well as interests and power structures.
Yet to exploit the full potential of providing knowledge for better decision-making on river
basin management, it is essential to use the best available methods to generate information,
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and generate and disseminate information in a form that is relevant and accessible to the
stakeholders involved in decision processes. The “Integrating Governance and Modeling”
project within the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water & Food (CPWF) pursued this goal
by (a) developing computer-based decision tools for evaluating environmental-economicsocial interactions of river basin management in a participatory setting, and (b) by testing
and promoting the use of these decision tools within multi-stakeholder governance
structures. The research under this project was conducted in the White Volta Basin in
Ghana and the Maule Basin in Chile. During the course of the project, various decision
support tools were developed in close collaboration with stakeholders in both countries.
Tools included whole-farm programming models, specific user maps from GIS, waterbalance models, hydrology simulation models, agent-based simulation models, and
network-influence-mapping. For reasons of scope, this paper concentrates on Chile and the
application of the agent-based software MP-MAS, which played a central role in this
project and which combined other different models mentioned above. Only results for one
use case will be presented, the construction of a water reservoir and how this might affect
the farmers’ willingness to pay. Other use cases involving other types of agents are
reported on http://www.igm.uni-hohenheim.de/.
2

Computer-based decision tools in practice

Computer-based decision tools have been proposed as an effective means to disentangle the
complexities and uncertainties related to the management of natural resources [Van
Paassen et al. 2007]. Agent-based simulation in particular has been suggested as a
promising approach to involve stakeholders in the definition and solution of resource use
problems [Parker et al. 2003]. Because of their interactive and participatory features, agentbased simulation can integrate various sources of knowledge and help to reach consensus
on the implementation of problem solutions [Becu et al., 2008].

Figure 1. Collaborative research and learning framework
Sterk et al. [2009] describe several ideotypical arrangements for using computer models as
decision tools at the science-policy interface. Knowledge broker is the arrangement relevant
for the decision tools developed and tested in this project. Compared to traditional
arrangements with a clear distinction between the science and policy domains, knowledge
broker means that scientists developing the models directly engage with interest groups
(resource users) and devote much effort in merging and transferring the scientific
knowledge generated by their models. The focus is on model-enhanced learning, i.e.
scientists, resource users, extension workers, government officials and other stakeholders
jointly increase their knowledge about the land system in question, exchange their views
and may then finally negotiate possible solutions.
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An important prerequisite for a useful decision support tool in a knowledge broker
arrangement is to earn the trust of stakeholders in the model and its simulation results. In
this project, a collaborative research and learning framework guided the joint development
of the model with those interested in using it (Figure 1). The joint development had three
objectives: (1) to improve the quality of information used to set up and parameterize the
model, (2) to ensure that the relevant questions and criteria can be addressed with the
model as well as to identify relevant and feasible policy options and (3) to provide decision
makers with access to the model which ideally includes training them to use it. The work
reported on here differs from the participatory modeling approaches used for common-pool
resources and social learning [D’Aquino et al. 2003]. Knowledge brokering in this use case
refers to market-oriented policy interventions that involve many stakeholders and in which
equilibrium outcomes cannot be easily predicted. Various stakeholders such as farmers,
water user associations, government agencies and other public sector organizations were
engaged in this simulation experiment and shared their data and points of view.
3

Setting for using agent-based simulation tools

Chile has a history of being at the forefront of water reform. The Chilean Water Code of
1981 established fully tradable water rights, separate to land rights; non-consumptive rights
for hydroelectricity generation were incorporated in the 1990s; and a number of policies to
promote investment in irrigation infrastructure have been implemented over the last 25
years. During the project period, private and public stakeholders were engaged in the
planning of a new reservoir to be built on the Ancoa River, about 300 km south of the
country’s capital Santiago de Chile. The region is characterized by a relatively high
percentage of rural population in small-scale agricultural holdings that undertake farming
on fertile soils but under low water security. Water security is defined here in percentage
terms as the likelihood (within 95% confidence limits) that a farmer can withdraw 100% of
water right entitlements in any given year. The low level of water security (between 25%85%) has historically limited farmers’ profitability and their ability to make investments in
high-value crops that require a secure water supply such as apples and raspberry for
exportation [Berger et al. 2007].
The Ancoa dam project aims to address this issue by the construction of a reservoir that can
capture and hold water during the winter season, and distribute it through the summer
irrigation season, thereby increasing water security for farmers. The construction of the
dam will be largely financed by the state but it also needs to recoup a net sum from farmers
over the life of the investment. Project calculations assessed this value to equate to
approximately 900,000 CHP (~1,120 Euro) per water right owned by the farmer (1 water
right ~= 1L/s which is sufficient to irrigate approximately 1 hectare of crop land). This
value is heavily subsidized to farmers however, based on the number of water rights they
own. A small-scale farmer possessing less than 5 water rights would be subsided 95% of
this price; a large-scale agricultural enterprise owning over 50 water rights would receive a
subsidy of 54.5%. For the dam construction to go ahead, the state required an agreement
from farmers equating to a minimum of 50% of total water rights within the region, that
they are willing to accept this pricing scheme (i.e. that they are willing to pay these costs
for the dam in order to gain the improved water security).
At the time of commencing our research, farmers, water user associations and various
government organizations were debating and negotiating the “terms of reference” for the
Ancoa dam, in particular the distribution of water rights among irrigation sectors, the
amounts of subsidy to be paid for small and large-scale holdings, and the timeline of
handing over the infrastructure after construction. Knowledge sources and information
needs differed considerably among stakeholders: farmers, for example, were keen to get a
better estimate of the “shadow price” of irrigation water at farm level, while government
officials were interested in reaching the 50 percent willingness to engage in the
construction works. Accordingly, the timing of the planning and negotiation process
provided a perfect setting for testing agent-based simulation tools within a knowledge
broker arrangement.
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Specification of the multi-agent software

MP-MAS is a freeware application developed at Hohenheim University and can be
downloaded from http://mp-mas.uni-hohenheim.de. A detailed user manual is available
from the same website. MP-MAS is written in C++ programming language and is available
for both UNIX and Windows operating systems. It works with a set of input files that are
organized in Microsoft Excel workbooks and can be manipulated through the user
interface, an MS-Excel Add-In programmed in Visual Basic. The user interface offers two
modes of using MP-MAS: for interactive simulation of single agents and for full simulation
of all agents in the study area. In single agent mode, MP-MAS simulates one decision
problem for one agent only, for example the land use plan for one particular year without
interactions with other agents. In full agent mode, MP-MAS simulates the decision-making
and actions of all agents, i.e. their production, investment and consumption decisions
[Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006], the agent-agent interactions and all relevant
biophysical processes, typically over several years.
The philosophy of agent-based modeling has always been to replicate the complexity of
human behavior with relatively simple rules of action and interaction [Parker et al., 2003].
In empirical applications to the complexity of land use changes, the question arises how
simple these rules need to be. Most applications have used relatively simple heuristics to
represent the economic decision-making of agents. Schreinemachers and Berger [2006]
argued that farm agents in such applications might have too limited heterogeneity and
adaptive capacity (decision trees are rather thin and make use of fixed input-output
relationships), and henceforth preferred implementing their farm agents with goal-driven
behavior based on mathematical programming (MP). The MP matrix used in this research
is an extension of the matrix developed by Berger [2001]. Other agents considered are
land-owners and reservoir managers; their decision rules, however, are represented with
heuristics and not MP. The MP matrix and all other input files of the Chile application can
be downloaded from the MP-MAS website.
The objective function of the MP is to maximize the farm agent’s total expected grossmargin. The matrix includes 18 specific crops, ranging from staples, pasture, vegetables,
industrial crops and perennial crops. For each crop, the model requires production
parameters for items such as yield, water usage, and labor requirements; however these
parameters vary considerably depending on the irrigation method used, the technology
level adopted and soil type that the crop is grown on. The matrix therefore includes many
production activities for each single crop, based on the machinery technology used, the soil
type grown on, and the irrigation method adopted (size of matrix: 943 columns, 249 rows).
Additional activities allow the agent to supplement its endowment of certain resources by
hiring/investing/lending. The model also includes activities that allow the farmer to create
off-farm income by selling excess labor and saving excess liquidity.
Following the land suitability classification used in Chile [Uribe et al, 2009], land resources
are designated to 5 soil types with different levels of crop suitability. Irrigation water
requirements are a function of crop water demands and irrigation efficiency and have been
adjusted by local experts following the FAO56 crop growth model [Allen et al. 2004]. The
monthly water constraints limit the sum of monthly production activity water usage to less
than the farmer’s expected monthly endowment. As is common in single time-frame linear
programming, crop rotation limits are implemented by limiting production activities to a
percentage of total available hectares as a proxy for crop rotation (e.g. corn is grown in 4
years out of 5 in rotation, thus corn limit is 80%). Other constraints considered are
machinery technology levels, farm labor in various time spans, and market access.
5

Calibration and validation

Good validation in the context of collaborative research and learning centers on the
research questions of stakeholders and develops confidence in the ability of the model to
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provide insight into these questions. This research here is about water shadow prices and
productivity at the farm-level, and as such the model’s land-use outputs (i.e. crop hectare
production levels) under different water allocation levels are essential outputs for
validation. The major land use categories analyzed are staple crops, pasture, vegetables,
rice, agro-industry crops, fallow and perennial crops. These different land uses have
significantly different water requirements, gross margins, and input requirements.
For the model to adequately predict crop production, farm-level allocation decisions must
be adequately represented, and this requires that MP-MAS (i) uses accurate parameter
values and (ii) includes the key resource constraints. The first point is addressed by
obtaining parameter data directly from the national statistics office, the project’s household
survey and Chilean experts from the study region. The second point is addressed by direct
interaction with stakeholders in the field through interactive validation sessions.
5.1

Interactive validation sessions

In addition to the project’s household survey, a special farm questionnaire was developed
for gaining in-depth information about farmer resource endowments, crop production
schedules, irrigation methods and attitude to water trading, to be used for model validation.
10 in-depth farm interviews were conducted, chosen where possible to be representative of
the greater basin population. The farm resource endowment data gathered in the in-depth
survey was used as input for single-agent simulations with MP-MAS, and the model results
were compared to actual farm production. In a second visit to the farmers, the disparities
between simulated and observed data were discussed. Important limiting constraints that
were not previously included in the model were noted and subsequently used to improve
the model. In this way, the model is validated interactively, and the most important
constraints are sure to be included.
Incorporating the improvements and fine-tuning the model as described above, increased
the accuracy of the model to observed data. For MP model validation, we use the
goodness-of-fit method and compare the major land use categories that are simulated and
observed. In Figure 2, simulated land use results for the 10 validation farms are regressed
on the observed land uses (here: staples, rice, vegetables, fruits, and pasture). The
regression line has a coefficient close to unity and a high R2 value, indicating a high
goodness of fit.
Of particular importance for this research is the ability of the model to accurately represent
farmer response to changing water allocations. To gain confidence in the model for this
particular task, water sensitivity analysis of the 10 validation farms is conducted, by
simulating each farm with water endowments varying from 50% to 150% of default level
endowments. The results are then compared to farmer verbatim captured in the in-depth
farm survey. In general, results highlight that the model successfully matches farmer
response to water allocation changes.
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Figure 2. Model validation (“goodness of fit”)
5.2

Up-scaling to the study region

Having validated the model at farm level through interactive simulation, it is then up-scaled
to the study region level by means of the Monte Carlo method of Berger and
Schreinemachers [2006]. The method uses statistical distributions to create farm
endowments for each farm (agent) within the study region. The sample data used for this
process is from the project’s household survey conducted in 2005 (http://www.igm.unihohenheim.de/cms/index.php?id=7). More details on this method for parameterization and
validation of the agent-based simulation model can be found in Berger et al. [2007] and
Schreinemachers et al. [2009].
As additional input for the up-scaling, we utilized available data obtained from Geographic
Information System (GIS) mapping (at a 1 Ha grid size) of the study region. Experts in
Chile classified each parcel according to soil type and farm ownership, thus the basis for
the population of agents is created directly from the empirical data. A total of 1,370 agents
are generated, accounting for over 33,000 Hectares (~90%) of the study region. Farms that
are smaller than 2 hectares are not included in the agent population. Due to lack of
empirical data at the time of the interactive modeling sessions, water rights were assigned
on a constant per hectare approach. This is a strong simplification as water rights per unit
land vary across the study region, however as the data was not yet available, a simplifying
assumption was required. It is strongly noted here, that this allocation of water rights will
directly impact the resultant shadow price of the farmer. In current model versions, we
employ the actual water right registries and perform extensive calibration and validation
tests using census data to ensure that the MP-MAS model resembles observed values at
basin level. For details on current model versions and tests, the reader is referred to the
project completion report available at http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/igm.
6

Simulation results

The single agent and the full agent modes of MP-MAS were used for simulation analysis.
We first present the summary of results for the single agent mode and discuss them in terms
of practical relevance for stakeholders; then we present the summary of results for the full
agent mode.
6.1

Single-agent simulation

As Section 3 highlighted, the Ancoa Dam Project seeks to increase irrigation security by
storing surplus winter flows and using them to ensure a full satisfaction of water rights in
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the summer months. Farmers as well as policy makers are interested in the economic value
(“shadow price”) of this increased water security for farmers. We are estimating the value
of fully securing one water right (i.e. 1 L/s) by comparing the total farm gross margin
between the baseline and after securing one of the farmer’s insecure rights (scenario
“without investments”). In a second step, we run the same two scenarios allowing the
farmer to adapt his asset structure by investments into machinery and perennial plantations
in order to arrive at conclusions for a longer term perspective (scenario “with
investments”). In a third step, additionally opportunities to invest in advanced irrigation
technologies to improve on-farm irrigation efficiency are considered (scenario “advanced
irrigation”).
Key features of the single-agent results are:
 The shadow price of water and therefore the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for securing
one water right is disparate between farms, and this is not just correlated with farm size
 In regular years, only 3 farms have increases in gross margins higher than the cost of
securing one of their water rights. If one considers adaptation by investments only two
farms remain.
 4, considering investments 5, farms have a shadow price of zero, although 2 of them
have no or only a minor share of insecure rights and thus cannot be affected. The
availability of advanced irrigation technologies only affects two farmers in regular
years. The effect is ambiguous: for one farmer the shadow price declines, while for the
other one it rises.
 Contrary to what one might expect, the effect of dry year conditions on the shadow
price of a secured water right is ambiguous. Although it rises for most farms, there are
2 farms where it is actually lower.
The key message from the farm-level analysis of shadow prices is clear: water shadow
price levels will be higher when the farmer is not constrained by lack of other resource
endowments, most importantly land and liquidity. This finding is neither new nor
surprising, it does reiterate, however, the importance of other resource endowments on the
shadow price of water, and the need to incorporate this effect when considering public
investments to improve water allocation and farmer profitability.
6.2

Full-agent simulation

Using the same procedure as in the single agent mode, the shadow price for each agent
within the study region can be assessed with MP-MAS. Figure 3 highlights the result of
this analysis for water allocations varying from 100% down to 60%. Shadow prices are
here expressed in Chilean Peso ($) per m3 irrigation water.
Key features of the full-agent results are:
 At 100% water allocation, over 50% of agents have a shadow price for water less than
$1 Peso/m3.
 As water allocation decreases, this percentage decreases, to about 15% at 60% water
allocation.
 The distribution graphs are more skewed the higher the water allocation i.e. the level
of water shadow prices is more unevenly distributed the higher the water allocation.
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Figure 3. Distribution of water shadow prices
The comparison between the results at different water allocation levels provides insight
into the benefits of the Ancoa dam. Figure 3 shows that around 40-50% of farms have a
significantly higher shadow prices at 60% than at 100% water allocation, suggesting that
these farms would benefit directly from increased security in water allocation that the
Ancoa dam would provide. Interestingly, this result turned out to be consistent with the
actual farmer response, which reached 45% approval level as of July 2007 and finally
exceeded the 50% minimum approval level by a slight margin. The graphs also indicate
that for water allocations closer to 100%, such as the 85% water allocation, the gap
between shadow price cumulative distribution functions is significantly smaller, suggesting
that farmers with already high levels of security of allocations will not benefit significantly
from the Ancoa dam.
On a more general scale, the results highlight how reallocation mechanisms could improve
the distribution of water. In theory, farmers with a low shadow price of water could sell
their rights to a farmer with a higher willingness to pay. At higher levels of shadow price
unevenness, the benefits of this type of water reallocation increase. Thus the inference is
that the Ancoa dam would increase the incentive for water trading to occur. Transaction
costs, physical limitations of water distribution and farmer risk aversion contribute to
limiting water trading, but the results nonetheless suggest there is room for reallocation to
benefit all farmers. Further investigation will investigate optimal pricing strategies for
promoting allocative efficiency. A commonly cited problem with the current trading
arrangements is imperfect information between farmers (Berger et al, 2007); the use of this
type of analysis could assess the socio-economic implications of this type of imperfect
market, and who wins and who loses.
7

Conclusions

Using agent-based land use models effectively—so that model users receive early
feedback, share their system understanding and improve the outcomes of their land-use
decisions [Hazell et al., 2001]—poses a number of challenges that have not been fully
resolved yet. This research tested computer-based decision tools in a knowledge broker
arrangement. As part of a project within the CGIAR Challenge Program for Water and
Food, a multi-agent simulation model was applied for evaluating farmer water shadow
prices and the overall willingness-to-pay for the construction of a new reservoir in Chile.
We developed a collaborative research and learning framework, in which the computer
tools were parameterized jointly with stakeholders and validated interactively.
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The use of the computer-based tools, i.e. the last step of the collaborative research and
learning framework, however, could not be monitored to the extent originally intended in
the project proposal (funding from the CGIAR Challenge Program completed after 4
years). Although stakeholders provided extensive datasets collected at their organizations,
cleaning and consolidating these datasets proved to be highly demanding in terms of time
and personnel. Stakeholders received training and gained experience with the computer
models during the course of the project but ready-to-use versions of the software were
available only at the final training workshops. A follow-up project in Chile will attempt to
monitor actual model use in terms of changes and impacts on stakeholder decision-making.
Monitoring activities will cover the following model use cases: changes in (i) operation of
two reservoirs in the study area and water distribution to the various irrigation sectors; (ii)
investment planning of the water user organizations for building new irrigation
infrastructure; (iii) implementation of irrigation subsidy programs of the National Irrigation
Commission, especially regarding the selection procedure of subsidized projects.
In general, stakeholder involvement and support for this research has been strong and
sustainable in Chile. Over the 4 years of the project, 3 out of 4 water user associations
continued to send their technical staff to all model training sessions. This can be seen as an
encouraging quality assessment, considering that water user associations in Chile are not
state-run organizations, but are directed and funded by farmers who typically have a highly
developed sense for opportunity costs of time and money.
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